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When Does Relay Transmission Give a More
Secure Connection in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks?
Chunxiao Cai, Yueming Cai, Xiangyun Zhou, Weiwei Yang, and Wendong Yang
Abstract—Relay transmission can enhance coverage and
throughput, while it can be vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks
due to the additional transmission of the source message at the
relay. Thus, whether or not one should use relay transmission for
secure communication is an interesting and important problem.
In this paper, we consider the transmission of a confidential
message from a source to a destination in a decentralized wireless
network in the presence of randomly distributed eavesdrop-
pers. The source-destination pair can be potentially assisted
by randomly distributed relays. For an arbitrary relay, we
derive exact expressions of secure connection probability for both
colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers. We further obtain
lower bound expressions on the secure connection probability,
which are accurate when the eavesdropper density is small.
By utilizing these lower bound expressions, we propose a relay
selection strategy to improve the secure connection probability.
By analytically comparing the secure connection probability
for direct transmission and relay transmission, we address the
important problem of whether or not to relay and discuss the
condition for relay transmission in terms of the relay density and
source-destination distance. These analytical results are accurate
in the small eavesdropper density regime.
Index Terms—Secure connection probability, homogenous
Poisson point process, randomize-and-forward, colluding eaves-
droppers, non-colluding eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
INFORMATION security of wireless communications hastaken on an increasingly important role as these networks
continue to flourish worldwide. Communications over wireless
networks are particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. To protect
confidential message transmission, physical layer security [1]
has been developed as a promising mechanism which provides
the protection at the physical layer by exploiting the random
and noisy nature of the wireless propagation channels. A key
feature of physical layer security is that the level of security
provided strongly depends on the amount of information
that the legitimate users know about the eavesdroppers. In
particular, perfect secrecy may not be always achievable if
the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is
not perfectly known. For this practical scenario, Bloch et al.
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studied the secure outage probability assuming no instanta-
neous CSI of the eavesdropper at the legitimate transmitter
[2]. Considering that the locations of passive eavesdroppers
are uncertain, e.g., in military communication networks, there
are a few recent studies which modeled the distribution of
eavesdroppers as a homogenous Poisson point process (PPP)
and studied the connectivity properties of such networks [3]-
[7]. However, most of these papers mainly focused on single-
hop transmissions, while multi-hop transmission was only
studied from a percolation point of view.
Due to their ability to extend coverage in wireless systems,
relay transmission technologies have received much atten-
tion. When secure communication is required, however, relay
transmission may be vulnerable to eavesdropping, because
the confidential information is broadcasted twice, i.e., by the
source and the relay. Thus, it is very interesting to study the
physical-layer security in relay networks. In [8], Lai and El
Gamal studied the four-node (source, destination, relay, eaves-
dropper) secure communication system and considered several
relay strategies, such as decode-and-forward (DF) and noise-
forwarding (NF). In [9], Jeong and Kim analyzed the power
allocation problem for secure rate maximization in a multi-
carrier decode-and-forward relay system. In [10], L. Dong
et al. considered a scenario in which a source communicates
with a destination with the help of multiple relays in the
presence of one or more eavesdroppers and used beamforming
to improve the security. Krikidis et al. studied relay and
jammer selection in relay systems with secrecy constraints
[11]. In [12], Chen et al. investigated joint relay and jammer
selection in two-way relay networks with security constraints.
Furthermore, our prior work in [13] studied the problem of
secure connectivity against colluding eavesdroppers where the
source-destination pair is assisted by a single randomize-and-
forward (RaF) relay defined in [14] [15]. All above papers
studied different ways of using relay transmission to improve
secrecy performance of relay networks without the direct link
between the source and destination. However, these papers
did not directly answer the basic question: With the purpose
of achieving a good secrecy performance, shall we use the
relay if there is already a direct link between the source and
destination?
B. Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we try to address the question of whether
or not to use relay transmission in wireless ad hoc net-
works from a secure connectivity perspective. We consider
that the locations of both the potential relays and malicious
2eavesdroppers are random following homogenous PPPs. The
widely-used RaF relaying strategy is assumed, which was
specifically designed for secure transmissions [14] [15]. Both
the cases of colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers are
considered, where the former represents a worst-case scenario
and the latter is a commonly assumed scenario in decentralized
wireless networks.
Firstly, assuming that a relay at an arbitrary location is
already chosen, we derive the exact expression of secure
connection probability for relay transmission. Then, a lower
bound on the secure connection probability is provided in
order to further study the optimal relay selection strategy.
We also derive the secure connection probability for direct
transmission from the source to the destination. Having the
secrecy performance of both relay transmission and direct
transmission, we provide an answer to whether or not to use re-
lay transmission. In particular, we give an analytical expression
on the condition for relay transmission in terms of the relay
density and the distance between the source and destination,
for a given target secure connection probability. The analytical
results are very accurate in the small eavesdropper density
regime.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we study the system model. Section III obtains the perfor-
mance analysis for colluding eavesdroppers. In Section IV, we
analyze the performance analysis for non-colluding eavesdrop-
pers. Section V studies the condition for relay transmission.
Concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig.1, we consider a relay network consisting
of one source (S), several relays (Rl, l = 1, 2, ...), one desti-
nation (D), and several eavesdroppers (Ej , j = 1, 2, ...). All
the nodes are equiped with one antenna. The distance between
the source and destination is equal to dSD . The distributions
of relays and eavesdroppers are homogenous PPPs ΦR and
ΦE with density λR and λE , respectively. In this system,
all the transmitters transmit with the same power. Then we
can obtain the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
relays, destination, and eavesdroppers as
SNRnm = εhnmd
−α
nm (1)
where ε is the transmit SNR, hnm and dmn=‖xm−xn‖ mean
the small-scale fading and the Euclidean distance between
node n and node m, respectively, and xn is the location
of node n. We assume that hnm follows the exponential
distribution with unit mean, and d−αnm denotes the large-
scale fading with path-loss exponent α > 2. We assume
the source has the instantaneous CSI of the links from the
source to the relays and from the source to the destination,
and the relays have the instantaneous CSI of the links from
the relays to the destination. We assume the source and the
relays do not have the instantaneous CSI of the links from
the source to the eavesdroppers and from the relays to the
eavesdroppers, respectively. Furthermore, receiver side CSI is
always assumed.
In this paper, the source performs relay selection and
decides whether a relay is needed. We assume that dSD,
Fig. 1. System Model.
and the node densities, i.e., λE and λR, are known network
parameters. The relays can measure their distances to both the
source and the destination, then report the distances to the
source.
To facilitate the analysis, a polar coordinate system is
set up in which the source and destination locates at(
dSD
2 , 0
)
and
(
dSD
2 , pi
)
, respectively. In a polar coordinate
system, for a relay at xRl = (r, θ), define two auxil-
iary functions to represent the distances from the arbi-
trary relay to the source and the destination respectively:
dSRl = ‖xS−xRl‖ =
√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 −rdSD cos θ, and dRlD =
‖xRl−xD‖=
√
r2+
d2
SD
4 +rdSD cos θ.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR COLLUDING
EAVESDROPPERS
There are two types of eavesdroppers depending on whether
the eavesdroppers combine the received information: colluding
eavesdroppers and non-colluding eavesdroppers [7]. The col-
luding eavesdroppers case is the worst scenario from the secure
communication viewpoint. It means that all the eavesdroppers
can exchange and combine the received information to decode
the secret message. On the other hand, the non-colluding
eavesdroppers case means that the eavesdroppers are not
allowed to collude, and secure performance is determined
with the strongest received signal from the transmitter. In
this section, we study the secure connection probability for
colluding eavesdroppers, and obtain the exact expressions of
secure connection probability for the direct transmission and
relay transmission assuming an arbitrary relay, respectively.
Then the lower bound for colluding eavesdroppers is obtained,
and the lower bound gives accurate approximation of the exact
performance when the eavesdropper density is small. Using the
lower bound, we find that the optimum relay is the nearest one
to the midpoint between the source and destination, and get
the lower bound expression for relay selection.
For colluding eavesdroppers case, the combined received
SNR at eavesdroppers from the source and the relay node Rl
3can be respectively written as [7]
εIS =
∑
Ej∈ΦE
εhSEjd
−α
SEj
(2)
εIRl =
∑
Ej∈ΦE
εhRlEjd
−α
RlEj
(3)
A. Direct Transmission
From a connectivity point of view, a secure connection from
the source to the destination is possible if the secrecy rate
is positive [7]. The secure connection probability for direct
transmission can be defined as
PC DT = P
(
log2
( 1+εhSDd−αSD
1+εIS
)
> 0
)
= P
(
εhSDd
−α
SD
εIS
> 1
)
= EIS {exp [−ISdαSD]}
= LIS (d
α
SD)
(4)
where EIS {·} and LIS (·) is expected value and Laplace
transform of IS , respectively. Then we can get [16]
LIS (d
α
SD)
= EhSEj ,ΦE
{
exp
[
− ∑
Ej∈ΦE
dαSDhSEj
∥∥xS − xEj∥∥−α
]}
= EhSEj ,ΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
exp
[
−dαSDhSEj ‖xS − xE2‖−α
]}
(ω)
=EΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
EhSEj
{
exp
[
−dαSDhSEj
∥∥xS − xEj∥∥−α]}
}
= EΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
1
1+dα
SD‖xS−xEj‖−α
}
(5)
where ω means that hSEj is independent and identically
distributed fading and independent of ΦE , thus the expectation
over hSEj can be moved inside the product. For a homogenous
PPP, the generating function is given by [17]
EΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
f
(
xEj
)}
= exp
[
−λE
∫
R2
(
1− f (xEj))dxEj
]
(6)
Then (5) can be derived as
PC DT = exp
[
−λE
∫
R2
1− 1
1+dα
SD‖xS−xEj‖−α dxEj
]
= exp
[−Ad2SD] (7)
where A= 2piλE
α
Γ
(
2
α
)
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
, Γ(·) is the gamma function.
B. Relay Transmission
The communication protocol is a hybrid mode that allows
adaptive switching between direct transmission and relay
transmission. In this paper, however, we consider a switching
criterion with priority on the use of a direct transmission.
Then, the relay transmission is only used when the direct
path does not satisfy the target security requirement. For relay
transmission, we use RaF strategy. According to [14], RaF
means that the source and relay use independent randomization
signal in each hop. The communication is divided into two
slots. In the first time slot, the source sends data to the relays.
In the second time slot, only the selected relay sends data to
the destination. In [14], it has been shown that under the RaF
strategy, securing each individual hop is sufficient for securing
the end-to-end transmission, so the message is secured if the
two hops are both secured.
For an arbitrary relay Rl, the message is secure only if both
the S → Rl link and the Rl → D link are secure. Thus, the
secure connection probability can be obtained as
PC Rl
= P
(
1
2 log2
(
1+εhSRld
−α
SRl
1+εIS
)
> 0, 12 log2
(
1+εhSRld
−α
RlD
1+εIRl
)
>0
)
= P
(
hSRld
−α
SRl
IS
> 1,
hSRld
−α
RlD
IRl
> 1
)
= EIS ,IRl
(
exp
[−ISdαSRl − IRldαRlD])
= LIS ,IRl
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
(8)
where LIS ,IRl (·, ·) is the joint Laplace transform of IS and
IRl [18], and it can be calculated as (9), shown at the top of
the next page.
Using (6), then, the secure connection probability for an
arbitrary relay can be written as
PC Rl = exp
[− (Ad2SRl +Ad2RlD − λEf (dαSRl , dαRlD))](10)
In (10), f (dαSRl , dαRlD) can be obtained as
f
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
=
∫
R2
1(
1+d−α
SRl
‖xS−xEj‖α
)(
1+d−α
RlD
‖xRl−xEj‖α
)dxEj
(11)
Notice that f
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
in (11) accounts for the statis-
tical dependence between the received SNRs at two different
locations.
From (11), we can find that the function f (·, ·) can not
be computed in a closed form. From (10) and (11), we can
also find that when λE → 0, exp
[
λEf
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)] → 1.
Then, we can get the lower bound of (10). It shows that
f
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
is non-negative, thus, the lower bound of the
secure connection probability can be defined as
PC Rl lower = exp
[− (Ad2SRl +Ad2RlD)] (12)
Substituting dSRl =
√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 − rdSD cos θ, and
dRlD =
√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 + rdSD cos θ into (12), (12) can be
written as
PC Rl lower = exp
[
−Ad
2
SD
2
− 2Ar2
]
(13)
From (10) and (12), we can get
PC Rl
PC Rl lower
= exp
[
λEf
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)]
< exp
[
min
{
Ad2SRl , Ad
2
RlD
}] (14)
It shows that when λE → 0, PC RlPC Rl lower → 1. Fig.2 shows
secure connection probability for colluding eavesdroppers as
a function of λE , where (·, ·) means the relay location. It is
shown that the secure connection probability decreases with
4LIS,IRl
(
dαSRl, d
α
RlD
)
=EhSEj,hRlEj ,ΦE
{
exp
[
− ∑
Ej∈ΦE
(
dαSRlhSEj
∥∥xS−xEj∥∥−α+dαRlDhRlEj ∥∥xRl−xEj∥∥−α)]}
= EΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
(
1
1+dα
SRl
‖xS−xEj‖−α ·
1
1+dα
RlD
‖xRl−xEj‖−α
)} (9)
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Fig. 2. Secure connection probability for colluding eavesdroppers as a
function of λE when α = 4, dSD = 20m.
the increase of λE . Through the gap between the lower bound
and the exact value becomes larger with the increase of λE ,
we can find that the result obtained by using the lower bound
gives accurate approximation of the exact performance when
the distribution of eavesdroppers is sparse. Then we can use
(13) to analyze the secure connection probability instead of
(10) in the small eavesdropper density regime.
C. Relay Selection
From Fig.2, we can also find that the location of the arbitrary
relay has influence on the secure connection probability. Then,
we can improve the secure connection probability through a
relay selection strategy. It shows in (13) that when r → 0,
PC Rl lower → exp
[−Ad2SD2 ]. Thus, we can find the relay
which is nearest to the midpoint between the source and
destination has the better secure connectivity probability. Thus
the index of the best relay can be shown as
J = arg min
Rl∈ΦR
{‖xRl‖} (15)
The probability distribution of ‖xRJ‖ is [19]
P‖xRJ‖ (r) = λR exp
[−λRpir2] (16)
From the homogeneity of PPP, the angle of ‖xRJ ‖ should be
a uniform random variable in [0, 2pi ), independent of its norm.
From (13) and (16), the lower bound of the secure connection
probability can be expressed as
PC RJ lower
=
∫
R2
exp
[
−
(
Ad2SD
2 + 2Ar
2
)]
λR exp
[−λRpir2] dxRJ
= exp
[
−Ad2SD2
] ∫ 2pi
0
∫ +∞
0
λR exp
[− (2A+ λRpi) r2]rdrdθ
= λRpi2A+λRpi exp
[
−Ad2SD2
]
(17)
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR NON-COLLUDING
EAVESDROPPERS
We will investigate the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Assume eavesdroppers can not be allowed to collude and
exchange information. The secure performance is determined
with the strongest received signal from the transmitter. In this
section, we obtain the exact expressions of secure connection
probability for the direct transmission and relay transmission
assuming an arbitrary relay, respectively. Then we analyze the
lower bound for non-colluding eavesdroppers and find that
the lower bound is close to the exact performance when the
eavesdropper density is small. Using the same optimum relay
selection strategy with colluding eavesdroppers, we obtain the
lower bound expressions for relay selection.
For non-colluding eavesdroppers case, the received SNR
at eavesdroppers from the source and relay node Rl can be
respectively written as
εUS = max
Ej∈ΦE
{
εhSEjd
−α
SEj
}
(18)
εURl = max
Ej∈ΦE
{
εhRlEjd
−α
RlEj
}
(19)
A. Direct Transmission
Similar to the case of colluding eavesdroppers, the secure
connection probability for direct transmission can be defined
as [7]
PC DT
= P
(
log2
(
1+εhSDd
−α
SD
1+εUS
)
> 0
)
= P

 hSDd−αSD
max
Ej∈ΦE
{
hSD‖xS−xEj‖−α
} > 1


= EhSD,ΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
P
(
hSDd
−α
SD
hSD‖xS−xEj‖−α > 1 |hSD,ΦE
)}
(20)
Using (6), (20) can be written as
PC DT
= EhSD
{
exp
[
−λE
∫
R2
P
(
hSDd
−α
SD
hSEj‖xS−xEj‖−α <1 |hSD
)
dxEj
]}
= EhSD
{
exp
[
−2piλE
∫ +∞
0
exp
[−hSDd−αSDrα] rdr]}
(21)
Using [20,3.381.10.4], (21) can be calculated as
PC DT = Eh
SD
{
exp
[
−λEpid2SDΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)
h
− 2
α
SD
]}
(22)
Using Jensen′s inequality, the lower bound of secure con-
nection probability can be obtained as
PC DT > exp
[
−λEpid2SDΓ
(
1 + 2
α
)
Eh
SD
{
h
− 2
α
SD
}]
= exp
[−Ad2SD] (23)
5We can find that (23) is the same as (7), and it means that
the secure connection probability for colluding eavesdroppers
is worse than that of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
B. Relay Transmission
Similar to the case of colluding eavesdroppers, the secure
connection probability for an arbitrary relay can be written as
(24), shown at the top of the next page.
Using (6), (24) can be derived as (25), shown at the top of
the next page.
In (25), g (dαSRl , dαRlD) can be expressed as (26), written at
the top of the next page.
Notice that g
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
in (26) accounts for the statis-
tical dependence between the received SNRs at two different
locations.
From (26), we can find that it is very difficult to obtain
a close-form expression of g
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
. However, we can
get the lower bound of (25). It shows that g (dαSRl , dαRlD)
is non-negative, then, the lower bound of secure connection
probability can be written as (27), given at the top of the next
page.
Substituting dSRl=
√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 − rdSD cos θ, and dRlD =√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 +rdSD cos θ into (27), the lower bound of secure
connection probability can be obtained as (28), written at the
top of the next page.
Using Jensen′s inequality, (28) can be expressed as
PC Rl lower > exp
[
−Ad
2
SD
2
− 2Ar2
]
(29)
Interestingly, we find that (29) is the same as (13). Both (28)
and (29) are lower bounds of secure connection probability for
non-colluding eavesdroppers, while it is obvious that the lower
bound of (28) is tighter than that of (29).
From (25) and (27), we can get (30), shown at the top of
the next page.
It is shown that when λE → 0, PC RlPC Rl lower → 1. Fig.3
shows the secure connection probability for non-colluding
eavesdroppers as a function of λE . In Fig.3, we can obtain
the same results with colluding eavesdroppers. What is more,
we can find that the lower bound of (28) is tighter than that
of (29).
C. Relay Selection
We can improve the secure connection probability through
a relay selection strategy. Based on (29), the optimum relay
selection strategy for non-colluding eavesdroppers is still the
relay which is the nearest to the midpoint between source and
destination. Though (29) is the lower bound of non-colluding
eavesdroppers, we want to obtain the tighter lower bound
instead of (29). Then, based on (16) and (28), we can get
(31), shown at the top of the next page.
Using the fact that I0 (x)= 1pi
∫ pi
0
e±x cos θdθ, (31) can be
obtained as (32), written at the top of the next page.
Using the fact that I0 (x) =
+∞∑
n=0
x2n
(n!)222n
, (32) can be
derived as (33), given at the top of the next page.
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Fig. 3. Secure connection probability for non-colluding eavesdroppers as a
function of λE when α = 4, dSD = 20m.
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Using [20,3.381.10], (33) can be written as (34), derived at
the top of the next page.
Fig.4 shows the secure connection probability as a function
of λE when λR = 10−2, 10−3, α = 4 and dSD = 20.
Firstly, we can find that our theoretical results for direct
transmission match the simulation results perfectly for two
strategies. The lower bounds of secure connection probability
for relay transmission for both the two strategies are very close
to the simulation results, when λE is low, and the gap between
them becomes larger with λE increasing. Secondly, the secure
connection probability for non-colluding eavesdroppers is bet-
ter than that of colluding eavesdroppers. Thirdly, it is shown
that the secure connection probability for relay transmission
depends on the relay density. When λR is low, the secure
connection probability for relay transmission is worse. From
Fig. 4, we do not know how to decide whether or not to
cooperate distinctly.
6PC Rl = P
(
1
2 log2
( 1+εhSRld−αSRl
1+εUS
)
> 0, 12 log2
( 1+εhRlDd−αRlD
1+εURl
)
> 0
)
= P
(
εhSRld
−α
SRl
max
Ej∈ΦE
{
εhSEj‖xS−xEj‖−α
} > 1, εhRlDd
−α
RlD
max
Ej∈ΦE
{
εhRlEj‖xRl−xEj‖−α
} > 1
)
= EhSRl ,hRlD,ΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
P
(
hSRld
−α
SRl
hSEj‖xS−xEj‖−α > 1,
hRlDd
−α
RlD
hRlEj‖xRl−xEj‖−α > 1 |hSRl , hRlD,ΦE
)} (24)
PC Rl=EhSRl ,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλE
(
d2SRlΓ
(
1+
2
α
)
h
− 2
α
SRl
+d2RlDΓ
(
1+
2
α
)
h
− 2
α
RlD
)
+ λEg
(
dαSEj , d
α
RlEj
)]}
(25)
g
(
dαSEj,d
α
RlEj
)
=
∫
R2
exp
[−hSRld−αSRl ∥∥xS − xEj∥∥α − hRlDd−αRlD ∥∥xRl − xEj∥∥α] dxEj (26)
PC Rl lower = EhSRl ,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)(
d2SRl (hSRl)
− 2
α + d2RlD (hRlD)
− 2
α
)]}
(27)
PC Rl lower = EhSRl,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)((
r2+
d2SD
4
−rdSD cos θ
)
h
− 2
α
SRl
+
(
r2 +
d2SD
4
+rdSD cos θ
)
h
− 2
α
RlD
)]}
(28)
PC Rl
PC Rl lower
=
EhSRl
,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλE
(
d2SRl
Γ(1+ 2α )h
−
2
α
SRl
+d2RlD
Γ(1+ 2α )h
−
2
α
RlD
)
+λEg
(
dαSEj
,dαRlEj
)]}
EhSRl
,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλE
(
d2
SRl
Γ(1+ 2α)h
−
2
α
SRl
+d2
RlD
Γ(1+ 2α)h
−
2
α
RlD
)]}
<
min
{
EhSRl
{
exp
[
−λEpid2SRlΓ(1+
2
α)h
−
2
α
SRl
]}
,EhRlD
{
exp
[
−λEpid2RlDΓ(1+
2
α )h
−
2
α
RlD
]}}
EhSRl
{
exp
[
−piλEd2SRlΓ(1+
2
α )h
−
2
α
SRl
]}
EhRlD
{
exp
[
−piλEd2RlDΓ(1+
2
α )h
−
2
α
RlD
]}
= min
{
1
EhSRl
{
exp
[
−λEpid2SRlΓ(1+
2
α)h
−
2
α
SRl
]} , 1
EhRlD
{
exp
[
−λEpid2RlDΓ(1+
2
α )h
−
2
α
RlD
]}
}
(30)
PC RJ lower = EhSRJ ,hRJD
{∫
R2
exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)(
r2 +
d2SD
4
)]
× λR exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
rdSD cos θ − λRpir2
]
dxRJ
}
= EhSRJ ,hRJD
{∫ 2pi
0
∫ +∞
0 exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)(
r2 +
d2SD
4
)]
× λR exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
rdSD cos θ − λRpir2
]
rdrdθ
}
(31)
PC RJ lower = EhSRJ ,hRJD
{∫ +∞
0 exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)(
d2SD
4 + r
2
)]
×2piI0
(
piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
rdSD
)
λR exp
[−λRpir2] rdr
} (32)
PC RJ lower = EhSRJ ,hRJD
{
+∞∑
n=0
(
piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
dSD
)2n
2piλR
(n!)222n
× ∫ +∞0 exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
)(
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)(
d2SD
4 + r
2
)
− λRpir2
]
r2n+1dr
} (33)
V. THE CONDITION FOR RELAY TRANSMISSION
A. Colluding eavesdroppers
The relay transmission is not necessary if the direct trans-
mission is strong enough. According to dSD, we can know
7PC RJ lower=EhSRJ ,hRJD


pi
+∞∑
n=0
λR
(
piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
dSD
)2n
exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)
d2SD
4
]
n!22n
(
piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
))1+n


(34)
how strong the direct transmission is. For colluding eaves-
droppers, to avoid relaying for the users having strong direct
transmission we define a target secure connection probability δ
constraint for direct transmission, thus the upper bound dSD D
for dSD based on a target secure connection probability δ can
be written as
dSD D (δ) = max
{
dSD : exp
(−Ad2SD) > δ}
=
√
ln(1/δ)
A
(35)
Similar to the direct transmission, the upper bound dSD R
for dSD using relay transmission based on a target secure
connection probability δ can be written as
dSD R (δ) = max
{
dSD :
λRpi
2A+λRpi
exp
(
−Ad2SD2
)
> δ
}
=
√
2
A
ln
(
δ(2A+λRpi)
λRpi
)−1
(36)
If λRpi
δ(2A+λRpi)
< 1, we define dSD R (δ) = 0, which
means relay transmission strategy does not work for collud-
ing eavesdroppers. From (35), we can know that the target
secure connection probability can not be satisfied using direct
transmission, when dSD > dSD D. When dSD >
√
ln(1/δ)
A
,
we want to find how high λR can satisfy the target secure
connection probability for relay transmission.
Then, we define the secure gain G (δ) as the ratio of the
farther distance achieved between the source and the destina-
tion by using relay transmission and direct transmission, and
the secure gain for colluding eavesdroppers is shown as
G (δ) =
√√√√2 ln( λRpiδ(2A+λRpi)
)
ln (1/δ)
(37)
From (37), we can get when λR > 2A(δ+
√
δ)
pi(1−δ) , G (δ) > 1.
Because the source knows the relative distances between the
destination, the relays, and itself, it can decide whether a
relay is needed through (35), (36) and (37). The detailed
procedure is listed as follows: when dSD < dSD D , the direct
transmission is strong enough for the target secure connection
probability, then relay transmission is not necessary. Secondly,
when dSD > dSD D, the direct transmission can not satisfy
the target secure connection probability, then relay transmis-
sion can be used if λR >
2A(δ+
√
δ)
pi(1−δ) . Then, the relay selection
strategy is based on (15).
B. Non-colluding eavesdroppers
For non-colluding eavesdroppers, we find that (22) and (34)
are not easy to analyze because of the integrals. However,
we can also find that (7) and (17) is the lower bound
for direct transmission and relay transmission of colluding
eavesdroppers, respectively. Then, we can use the results of
(35) and (36) to analyze whether or not to relay transmission
for non-colluding eavesdroppers. Because (7) is the lower
bound for direct transmission of colluding eavesdroppers, thus
when dSD >
√
ln(1/δ)
A
, the given target secure connection
probability δ can be satisfied using direct transmission, while
if λR >
2A(δ+
√
δ)
pi(1−δ) , the given target secure connection prob-
ability δ must be satisfied using relay transmission, then we
can regard the results of (35) and (36) as a sufficient condition
for using relay transmission for non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Thus, the detailed procedures for determining whether a relay
is needed and which relay is selected are the same as the ones
in the colluding eavesdroppers case.
Fig. 5 shows the secure gain as a function of λR when
α = 4, and λE = 10−3, 10−5. From (36), we can find that
the secure gain become better with the increase of λR. When
λR → +∞, G (δ) →
√
2. When G (δ) < 1, it means that the
secure connection probability for direct transmission is better
than that of relay transmission. In this case, relay transmission
is not necessary even if the target secure connection prob-
ability can not be satisfied using direct transmission. When
G (δ) > 1, it means that the dSD R is farther than dSD D.
When dSD D > dSD, the direct transmission is still strong
enough for the target secure connection probability, then relay
transmission is not necessary. Only when dSD D < dSD , relay
transmission is necessary. From Fig.5, we can know how high
λR can match the case.
Fig. 6 shows the secure connection probability as a function
of λE when α = 4, λR = 10−3, 10−4, λE = 10−5, and
δ = 0.7. From (35), the upper bound dSD D for dSD is
85m. From (36), the upper bound dSD R for dSD is 115m
and 58m at λR = 10−3, 10−4, respectively. In Fig. 6, for
colluding eavesdroppers, we can find that when dSD > 85m,
direct transmission can not satisfy the target secure connection
probability. However, only if λR >
2A(δ+
√
δ)
pi(1−δ) = 1.6 × 10−4,
the secure connection probability for relay transmission can
satisfy the target secure connection probability. Then, it is
shown that when λR = 10−4 < 1.6×10−4, relay transmission
can not satisfy the target secure connection probability, while
when λR = 10−3 > 1.6× 10−4, the target secure connection
probability can be satisfied using relay transmission. For non-
colluding eavesdroppers, because (35) is the lower bound for
direct transmission, we can find that when dSD > 85m,
direct transmission can still satisfy the target secure connection
probability. However, when λR > 1.6 × 10−4, the secure
connection probability for relay transmission must satisfy the
target secure connection probability. Thus, the analysis results
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of (35) and (36) are regarded as a sufficient condition for using
relay transmission in non-colluding eavesdroppers case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the secure connection prob-
ability of direct transmission and relay transmission for collud-
ing eavesdroppers and non-colluding eavesdroppers strategies,
where the distributions of relays and eavesdroppers follow
homogenous PPPs. The lower bound expressions of secure
connection probability using RaF for colluding eavesdroppers
and non-colluding eavesdroppers strategies are obtained, and
it shows that the lower bound gives accurate approximation
of the exact performance in the small eavesdropper density
regime. Comparing the direct transmission with the relay
transmission, we find that whether or not to relay transmission
depends on the relay density and the distance between the
source and destination for a given target secure connection
probability. The results obtained from this study provide useful
design insights for relay networks with security constraints.
This paper focuses on the selection of one relay (i.e. best
relay). An interesting future work is to consider multi-relay
transmission and determine the condition under which relaying
gives more secure connection.
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When Does Relay Transmission Give a More
Secure Connection in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks?
Chunxiao Cai, Yueming Cai, Xiangyun Zhou, Weiwei Yang, and Wendong Yang
Abstract—Relay transmission can enhance coverage and
throughput, while it can be vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks
due to the additional transmission of the source message at the
relay. Thus, whether or not one should use relay transmission for
secure communication is an interesting and important problem.
In this paper, we consider the transmission of a confidential
message from a source to a destination in a decentralized wireless
network in the presence of randomly distributed eavesdrop-
pers. The source-destination pair can be potentially assisted
by randomly distributed relays. For an arbitrary relay, we
derive exact expressions of secure connection probability for both
colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers. We further obtain
lower bound expressions on the secure connection probability,
which are accurate when the eavesdropper density is small.
By utilizing these lower bound expressions, we propose a relay
selection strategy to improve the secure connection probability.
By analytically comparing the secure connection probability
for direct transmission and relay transmission, we address the
important problem of whether or not to relay and discuss the
condition for relay transmission in terms of the relay density and
source-destination distance. These analytical results are accurate
in the small eavesdropper density regime.
Index Terms—Secure connection probability, homogenous
Poisson point process, randomize-and-forward, colluding eaves-
droppers, non-colluding eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
INFORMATION security of wireless communications hastaken on an increasingly important role as these networks
continue to flourish worldwide. Communications over wireless
networks are particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. To protect
confidential message transmission, physical layer security [1]
has been developed as a promising mechanism which provides
the protection at the physical layer by exploiting the random
and noisy nature of the wireless propagation channels. A key
feature of physical layer security is that the level of security
provided strongly depends on the amount of information
that the legitimate users know about the eavesdroppers. In
particular, perfect secrecy may not be always achievable if
the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is
not perfectly known. For this practical scenario, Bloch et al.
studied the secure outage probability assuming no instanta-
neous CSI of the eavesdropper at the legitimate transmitter
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[2]. Considering that the locations of passive eavesdroppers
are uncertain, e.g., in military communication networks, there
are a few recent studies which modeled the distribution of
eavesdroppers as a homogenous Poisson point process (PPP)
and studied the connectivity properties of such networks [3]-
[7]. However, most of these papers mainly focused on single-
hop transmissions, while multi-hop transmission was only
studied from a percolation point of view.
Due to their ability to extend coverage in wireless systems,
relay transmission technologies have received much atten-
tion. When secure communication is required, however, relay
transmission may be vulnerable to eavesdropping, because
the confidential information is broadcasted twice, i.e., by the
source and the relay. Thus, it is very interesting to study the
physical-layer security in relay networks. In [8], Lai and El
Gamal studied the four-node (source, destination, relay, eaves-
dropper) secure communication system and considered several
relay strategies, such as decode-and-forward (DF) and noise-
forwarding (NF). In [9], Jeong and Kim analyzed the power
allocation problem for secure rate maximization in a multi-
carrier decode-and-forward relay system. In [10], L. Dong
et al. considered a scenario in which a source communicates
with a destination with the help of multiple relays in the
presence of one or more eavesdroppers and used beamforming
to improve the security. Krikidis et al. studied relay and
jammer selection in relay systems with secrecy constraints
[11]. In [12], Chen et al. investigated joint relay and jammer
selection in two-way relay networks with security constraints.
Furthermore, our prior work in [13] studied the problem of
secure connectivity against colluding eavesdroppers where the
source-destination pair is assisted by a single randomize-and-
forward (RaF) relay defined in [14] [15]. All above papers
studied different ways of using relay transmission to improve
secrecy performance of relay networks without the direct link
between the source and destination. However, these papers
did not directly answer the basic question: With the purpose
of achieving a good secrecy performance, shall we use the
relay if there is already a direct link between the source and
destination?
B. Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we try to address the question of whether
or not to use relay transmission in wireless ad hoc net-
works from a secure connectivity perspective. We consider
that the locations of both the potential relays and malicious
eavesdroppers are random following homogenous PPPs. The
widely-used RaF relaying strategy is assumed, which was
2specifically designed for secure transmissions [14] [15]. Both
the cases of colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers are
considered, where the former represents a worst-case scenario
and the latter is a commonly assumed scenario in decentralized
wireless networks.
Firstly, assuming that a relay at an arbitrary location is
already chosen, we derive the exact expression of secure
connection probability for relay transmission. Then, a lower
bound on the secure connection probability is provided in
order to further study the optimal relay selection strategy.
We also derive the secure connection probability for direct
transmission from the source to the destination. Having the
secrecy performance of both relay transmission and direct
transmission, we provide an answer to whether or not to use re-
lay transmission. In particular, we give an analytical expression
on the condition for relay transmission in terms of the relay
density and the distance between the source and destination,
for a given target secure connection probability. The analytical
results are very accurate in the small eavesdropper density
regime.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we study the system model. Section III obtains the perfor-
mance analysis for colluding eavesdroppers. In Section IV, we
analyze the performance analysis for non-colluding eavesdrop-
pers. Section V studies the condition for relay transmission.
Concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig.1, we consider a relay network consisting
of one source (S), several relays (Rl, l = 1, 2, ...), one desti-
nation (D), and several eavesdroppers (Ej , j = 1, 2, ...). All
the nodes are equiped with one antenna. The distance between
the source and destination is equal to dSD . The distributions
of relays and eavesdroppers are homogenous PPPs ΦR and
ΦE with density λR and λE , respectively. In this system,
all the transmitters transmit with the same power. Then we
can obtain the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
relays, destination, and eavesdroppers as
SNRnm = εhnmd
−α
nm (1)
where ε is the transmit SNR, hnm and dmn=‖xm−xn‖ mean
the small-scale fading and the Euclidean distance between
node n and node m, respectively, and xn is the location
of node n. We assume that hnm follows the exponential
distribution with unit mean, and d−αnm denotes the large-
scale fading with path-loss exponent α > 2. We assume
the source has the instantaneous CSI of the links from the
source to the relays and from the source to the destination,
and the relays have the instantaneous CSI of the links from
the relays to the destination. We assume the source and the
relays do not have the instantaneous CSI of the links from
the source to the eavesdroppers and from the relays to the
eavesdroppers, respectively. Furthermore, receiver side CSI is
always assumed.
In this paper, the source performs relay selection and
decides whether a relay is needed. We assume that dSD,
and the node densities, i.e., λE and λR, are known network
Fig. 1. System Model.
parameters. The relays can measure their distances to both the
source and the destination, then report the distances to the
source.
To facilitate the analysis, a polar coordinate system is
set up in which the source and destination locates at(
dSD
2 , 0
)
and
(
dSD
2 , pi
)
, respectively. In a polar coordinate
system, for a relay at xRl = (r, θ), define two auxil-
iary functions to represent the distances from the arbi-
trary relay to the source and the destination respectively:
dSRl = ‖xS−xRl‖ =
√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 −rdSD cos θ, and dRlD =
‖xRl−xD‖=
√
r2+
d2
SD
4 +rdSD cos θ.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR COLLUDING
EAVESDROPPERS
There are two types of eavesdroppers depending on whether
the eavesdroppers combine the received information: colluding
eavesdroppers and non-colluding eavesdroppers [7]. The col-
luding eavesdroppers case is the worst scenario from the secure
communication viewpoint. It means that all the eavesdroppers
can exchange and combine the received information to decode
the secret message. On the other hand, the non-colluding
eavesdroppers case means that the eavesdroppers are not
allowed to collude, and secure performance is determined
with the strongest received signal from the transmitter. In
this section, we study the secure connection probability for
colluding eavesdroppers, and obtain the exact expressions of
secure connection probability for the direct transmission and
relay transmission assuming an arbitrary relay, respectively.
Then the lower bound for colluding eavesdroppers is obtained,
and the lower bound gives accurate approximation of the exact
performance when the eavesdropper density is small. Using the
lower bound, we find that the optimum relay is the nearest one
to the midpoint between the source and destination, and get
the lower bound expression for relay selection.
For colluding eavesdroppers case, the combined received
SNR at eavesdroppers from the source and the relay node Rl
3can be respectively written as [7]
εIS =
∑
Ej∈ΦE
εhSEjd
−α
SEj
(2)
εIRl =
∑
Ej∈ΦE
εhRlEjd
−α
RlEj
(3)
A. Direct Transmission
From a connectivity point of view, a secure connection from
the source to the destination is possible if the secrecy rate
is positive [7]. The secure connection probability for direct
transmission can be defined as
PC DT = P
(
log2
( 1+εhSDd−αSD
1+εIS
)
> 0
)
= P
(
εhSDd
−α
SD
εIS
> 1
)
= EIS {exp [−ISdαSD]}
= LIS (d
α
SD)
(4)
where EIS {·} and LIS (·) is expected value and Laplace
transform of IS , respectively. Then we can get [16]
LIS (d
α
SD)
= EhSEj ,ΦE
{
exp
[
− ∑
Ej∈ΦE
dαSDhSEj
∥∥xS − xEj∥∥−α
]}
= EhSEj ,ΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
exp
[
−dαSDhSEj ‖xS − xE2‖−α
]}
(ω)
=EΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
EhSEj
{
exp
[
−dαSDhSEj
∥∥xS − xEj∥∥−α]}
}
= EΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
1
1+dα
SD‖xS−xEj‖−α
}
(5)
where ω means that hSEj is independent and identically
distributed fading and independent of ΦE , thus the expectation
over hSEj can be moved inside the product. For a homogenous
PPP, the generating function is given by [17]
EΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
f
(
xEj
)}
= exp
[
−λE
∫
R2
(
1− f (xEj))dxEj
]
(6)
Then (5) can be derived as
PC DT = exp
[
−λE
∫
R2
1− 1
1+dα
SD‖xS−xEj‖−α dxEj
]
= exp
[−Ad2SD] (7)
where A= 2piλE
α
Γ
(
2
α
)
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
, Γ(·) is the gamma function.
B. Relay Transmission
The communication protocol is a hybrid mode that allows
adaptive switching between direct transmission and relay
transmission. In this paper, however, we consider a switching
criterion with priority on the use of a direct transmission.
Then, the relay transmission is only used when the direct
path does not satisfy the target security requirement. For relay
transmission, we use RaF strategy. According to [14], RaF
means that the source and relay use independent randomization
signal in each hop. The communication is divided into two
slots. In the first time slot, the source sends data to the relays.
In the second time slot, only the selected relay sends data to
the destination. In [14], it has been shown that under the RaF
strategy, securing each individual hop is sufficient for securing
the end-to-end transmission, so the message is secured if the
two hops are both secured.
For an arbitrary relay Rl, the message is secure only if both
the S → Rl link and the Rl → D link are secure. Thus, the
secure connection probability can be obtained as
PC Rl
= P
(
1
2 log2
(
1+εhSRld
−α
SRl
1+εIS
)
> 0, 12 log2
(
1+εhSRld
−α
RlD
1+εIRl
)
>0
)
= P
(
hSRld
−α
SRl
IS
> 1,
hSRld
−α
RlD
IRl
> 1
)
= EIS ,IRl
(
exp
[−ISdαSRl − IRldαRlD])
= LIS ,IRl
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
(8)
where LIS ,IRl (·, ·) is the joint Laplace transform of IS and
IRl [18], and it can be calculated as (9), shown at the top of
the next page.
Using (6), then, the secure connection probability for an
arbitrary relay can be written as
PC Rl = exp
[− (Ad2SRl +Ad2RlD − λEf (dαSRl , dαRlD))](10)
In (10), f (dαSRl , dαRlD) can be obtained as
f
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
=
∫
R2
1(
1+d−α
SRl
‖xS−xEj‖α
)(
1+d−α
RlD
‖xRl−xEj‖α
)dxEj
(11)
Notice that f
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
in (11) accounts for the statis-
tical dependence between the received SNRs at two different
locations.
From (11), we can find that the function f (·, ·) can not
be computed in a closed form. From (10) and (11), we can
also find that when λE → 0, exp
[
λEf
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)] → 1.
Then, we can get the lower bound of (10). It shows that
f
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
is non-negative, thus, the lower bound of the
secure connection probability can be defined as
PC Rl lower = exp
[− (Ad2SRl +Ad2RlD)] (12)
Substituting dSRl =
√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 − rdSD cos θ, and
dRlD =
√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 + rdSD cos θ into (12), (12) can be
written as
PC Rl lower = exp
[
−Ad
2
SD
2
− 2Ar2
]
(13)
From (10) and (12), we can get
PC Rl
PC Rl lower
= exp
[
λEf
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)]
< exp
[
min
{
Ad2SRl , Ad
2
RlD
}] (14)
It shows that when λE → 0, PC RlPC Rl lower → 1. Fig.2 shows
secure connection probability for colluding eavesdroppers as
a function of λE , where (·, ·) means the relay location. It is
shown that the secure connection probability decreases with
4LIS,IRl
(
dαSRl, d
α
RlD
)
=EhSEj,hRlEj ,ΦE
{
exp
[
− ∑
Ej∈ΦE
(
dαSRlhSEj
∥∥xS−xEj∥∥−α+dαRlDhRlEj ∥∥xRl−xEj∥∥−α)]}
= EΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
(
1
1+dα
SRl
‖xS−xEj‖−α ·
1
1+dα
RlD
‖xRl−xEj‖−α
)} (9)
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
O
E
S
e
c
u
re
 c
o
n
n
e
c
tio
n
 p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
(25,0.75S ) Exact
(25,0.75S ) Lower bound
(15,0.25S ) Exact
(15,0.25S ) Lower bound
(5,0.5S ) Exact
(5,0.5S ) Lower bound
Fig. 2. Secure connection probability for colluding eavesdroppers as a
function of λE when α = 4, dSD = 20m.
the increase of λE . Through the gap between the lower bound
and the exact value becomes larger with the increase of λE ,
we can find that the result obtained by using the lower bound
gives accurate approximation of the exact performance when
the distribution of eavesdroppers is sparse. Then we can use
(13) to analyze the secure connection probability instead of
(10) in the small eavesdropper density regime.
C. Relay Selection
From Fig.2, we can also find that the location of the arbitrary
relay has influence on the secure connection probability. Then,
we can improve the secure connection probability through a
relay selection strategy. It shows in (13) that when r → 0,
PC Rl lower → exp
[−Ad2SD2 ]. Thus, we can find the relay
which is nearest to the midpoint between the source and
destination has the better secure connectivity probability. Thus
the index of the best relay can be shown as
J = arg min
Rl∈ΦR
{‖xRl‖} (15)
The probability distribution of ‖xRJ‖ is [19]
P‖xRJ‖ (r) = λR exp
[−λRpir2] (16)
From the homogeneity of PPP, the angle of ‖xRJ ‖ should be
a uniform random variable in [0, 2pi ), independent of its norm.
From (13) and (16), the lower bound of the secure connection
probability can be expressed as
PC RJ lower
=
∫
R2
exp
[
−
(
Ad2SD
2 + 2Ar
2
)]
λR exp
[−λRpir2] dxRJ
= exp
[
−Ad2SD2
] ∫ 2pi
0
∫ +∞
0
λR exp
[− (2A+ λRpi) r2]rdrdθ
= λRpi2A+λRpi exp
[
−Ad2SD2
]
(17)
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR NON-COLLUDING
EAVESDROPPERS
We will investigate the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Assume eavesdroppers can not be allowed to collude and
exchange information. The secure performance is determined
with the strongest received signal from the transmitter. In this
section, we obtain the exact expressions of secure connection
probability for the direct transmission and relay transmission
assuming an arbitrary relay, respectively. Then we analyze the
lower bound for non-colluding eavesdroppers and find that
the lower bound is close to the exact performance when the
eavesdropper density is small. Using the same optimum relay
selection strategy with colluding eavesdroppers, we obtain the
lower bound expressions for relay selection.
For non-colluding eavesdroppers case, the received SNR
at eavesdroppers from the source and relay node Rl can be
respectively written as
εUS = max
Ej∈ΦE
{
εhSEjd
−α
SEj
}
(18)
εURl = max
Ej∈ΦE
{
εhRlEjd
−α
RlEj
}
(19)
A. Direct Transmission
Similar to the case of colluding eavesdroppers, the secure
connection probability for direct transmission can be defined
as [7]
PC DT
= P
(
log2
(
1+εhSDd
−α
SD
1+εUS
)
> 0
)
= P

 hSDd−αSD
max
Ej∈ΦE
{
hSD‖xS−xEj‖−α
} > 1


= EhSD,ΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
P
(
hSDd
−α
SD
hSD‖xS−xEj‖−α > 1 |hSD,ΦE
)}
(20)
Using (6), (20) can be written as
PC DT
= EhSD
{
exp
[
−λE
∫
R2
P
(
hSDd
−α
SD
hSEj‖xS−xEj‖−α <1 |hSD
)
dxEj
]}
= EhSD
{
exp
[
−2piλE
∫ +∞
0
exp
[−hSDd−αSDrα] rdr]}
(21)
Using [20,3.381.10.4], (21) can be calculated as
PC DT = Eh
SD
{
exp
[
−λEpid2SDΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)
h
− 2
α
SD
]}
(22)
Using Jensen′s inequality, the lower bound of secure con-
nection probability can be obtained as
PC DT > exp
[
−λEpid2SDΓ
(
1 + 2
α
)
Eh
SD
{
h
− 2
α
SD
}]
= exp
[−Ad2SD] (23)
5We can find that (23) is the same as (7), and it means that
the secure connection probability for colluding eavesdroppers
is worse than that of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
B. Relay Transmission
Similar to the case of colluding eavesdroppers, the secure
connection probability for an arbitrary relay can be written as
(24), shown at the top of the next page.
Using (6), (24) can be derived as (25), shown at the top of
the next page.
In (25), g (dαSRl , dαRlD) can be expressed as (26), written at
the top of the next page.
Notice that g
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
in (26) accounts for the statis-
tical dependence between the received SNRs at two different
locations.
From (26), we can find that it is very difficult to obtain
a close-form expression of g
(
dαSRl , d
α
RlD
)
. However, we can
get the lower bound of (25). It shows that g (dαSRl , dαRlD)
is non-negative, then, the lower bound of secure connection
probability can be written as (27), given at the top of the next
page.
Substituting dSRl=
√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 − rdSD cos θ, and dRlD =√
r2 +
d2
SD
4 +rdSD cos θ into (27), the lower bound of secure
connection probability can be obtained as (28), written at the
top of the next page.
Using Jensen′s inequality, (28) can be expressed as
PC Rl lower > exp
[
−Ad
2
SD
2
− 2Ar2
]
(29)
Interestingly, we find that (29) is the same as (13). Both (28)
and (29) are lower bounds of secure connection probability for
non-colluding eavesdroppers, while it is obvious that the lower
bound of (28) is tighter than that of (29).
From (25) and (27), we can get (30), shown at the top of
the next page.
It is shown that when λE → 0, PC RlPC Rl lower → 1. Fig.3
shows the secure connection probability for non-colluding
eavesdroppers as a function of λE . In Fig.3, we can obtain
the same results with colluding eavesdroppers. What is more,
we can find that the lower bound of (28) is tighter than that
of (29).
C. Relay Selection
We can improve the secure connection probability through
a relay selection strategy. Based on (29), the optimum relay
selection strategy for non-colluding eavesdroppers is still the
relay which is the nearest to the midpoint between source and
destination. Though (29) is the lower bound of non-colluding
eavesdroppers, we want to obtain the tighter lower bound
instead of (29). Then, based on (16) and (28), we can get
(31), shown at the top of the next page.
Using the fact that I0 (x)= 1pi
∫ pi
0
e±x cos θdθ, (31) can be
obtained as (32), written at the top of the next page.
Using the fact that I0 (x) =
+∞∑
n=0
x2n
(n!)222n
, (32) can be
derived as (33), given at the top of the next page.
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Fig. 3. Secure connection probability for non-colluding eavesdroppers as a
function of λE when α = 4, dSD = 20m.
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Using [20,3.381.10], (33) can be written as (34), derived at
the top of the next page.
Fig.4 shows the secure connection probability as a function
of λE when λR = 10−2, 10−3, α = 4 and dSD = 20.
Firstly, we can find that our theoretical results for direct
transmission match the simulation results perfectly for two
strategies. The lower bounds of secure connection probability
for relay transmission for both the two strategies are very close
to the simulation results, when λE is low, and the gap between
them becomes larger with λE increasing. Secondly, the secure
connection probability for non-colluding eavesdroppers is bet-
ter than that of colluding eavesdroppers. Thirdly, it is shown
that the secure connection probability for relay transmission
depends on the relay density. When λR is low, the secure
connection probability for relay transmission is worse. From
Fig. 4, we do not know how to decide whether or not to
cooperate distinctly.
6PC Rl = P
(
1
2 log2
( 1+εhSRld−αSRl
1+εUS
)
> 0, 12 log2
( 1+εhRlDd−αRlD
1+εURl
)
> 0
)
= P
(
εhSRld
−α
SRl
max
Ej∈ΦE
{
εhSEj‖xS−xEj‖−α
} > 1, εhRlDd
−α
RlD
max
Ej∈ΦE
{
εhRlEj‖xRl−xEj‖−α
} > 1
)
= EhSRl ,hRlD,ΦE
{ ∏
Ej∈ΦE
P
(
hSRld
−α
SRl
hSEj‖xS−xEj‖−α > 1,
hRlDd
−α
RlD
hRlEj‖xRl−xEj‖−α > 1 |hSRl , hRlD,ΦE
)} (24)
PC Rl=EhSRl ,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλE
(
d2SRlΓ
(
1+
2
α
)
h
− 2
α
SRl
+d2RlDΓ
(
1+
2
α
)
h
− 2
α
RlD
)
+ λEg
(
dαSEj , d
α
RlEj
)]}
(25)
g
(
dαSEj,d
α
RlEj
)
=
∫
R2
exp
[−hSRld−αSRl ∥∥xS − xEj∥∥α − hRlDd−αRlD ∥∥xRl − xEj∥∥α] dxEj (26)
PC Rl lower = EhSRl ,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)(
d2SRl (hSRl)
− 2
α + d2RlD (hRlD)
− 2
α
)]}
(27)
PC Rl lower = EhSRl,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)((
r2+
d2SD
4
−rdSD cos θ
)
h
− 2
α
SRl
+
(
r2 +
d2SD
4
+rdSD cos θ
)
h
− 2
α
RlD
)]}
(28)
PC Rl
PC Rl lower
=
EhSRl
,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλE
(
d2SRl
Γ(1+ 2α )h
−
2
α
SRl
+d2RlD
Γ(1+ 2α )h
−
2
α
RlD
)
+λEg
(
dαSEj
,dαRlEj
)]}
EhSRl
,hRlD
{
exp
[
−piλE
(
d2
SRl
Γ(1+ 2α)h
−
2
α
SRl
+d2
RlD
Γ(1+ 2α)h
−
2
α
RlD
)]}
<
min
{
EhSRl
{
exp
[
−λEpid2SRlΓ(1+
2
α)h
−
2
α
SRl
]}
,EhRlD
{
exp
[
−λEpid2RlDΓ(1+
2
α )h
−
2
α
RlD
]}}
EhSRl
{
exp
[
−piλEd2SRlΓ(1+
2
α )h
−
2
α
SRl
]}
EhRlD
{
exp
[
−piλEd2RlDΓ(1+
2
α )h
−
2
α
RlD
]}
= min
{
1
EhSRl
{
exp
[
−λEpid2SRlΓ(1+
2
α)h
−
2
α
SRl
]} , 1
EhRlD
{
exp
[
−λEpid2RlDΓ(1+
2
α )h
−
2
α
RlD
]}
}
(30)
PC RJ lower = EhSRJ ,hRJD
{∫
R2
exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)(
r2 +
d2SD
4
)]
× λR exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
rdSD cos θ − λRpir2
]
dxRJ
}
= EhSRJ ,hRJD
{∫ 2pi
0
∫ +∞
0 exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)(
r2 +
d2SD
4
)]
× λR exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
rdSD cos θ − λRpir2
]
rdrdθ
}
(31)
PC RJ lower = EhSRJ ,hRJD
{∫ +∞
0 exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)(
d2SD
4 + r
2
)]
×2piI0
(
piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
rdSD
)
λR exp
[−λRpir2] rdr
} (32)
PC RJ lower = EhSRJ ,hRJD
{
+∞∑
n=0
(
piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
dSD
)2n
2piλR
(n!)222n
× ∫ +∞0 exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
)(
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)(
d2SD
4 + r
2
)
− λRpir2
]
r2n+1dr
} (33)
V. THE CONDITION FOR RELAY TRANSMISSION
A. Colluding eavesdroppers
The relay transmission is not necessary if the direct trans-
mission is strong enough. According to dSD, we can know
7PC RJ lower=EhSRJ ,hRJD


pi
+∞∑
n=0
λR
(
piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
RJD
− h−
2
α
SRJ
)
dSD
)2n
exp
[
−piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
)
d2SD
4
]
n!22n
(
piλEΓ
(
1 + 2
α
) (
h
− 2
α
SRJ
+ h
− 2
α
RJD
))1+n


(34)
how strong the direct transmission is. For colluding eaves-
droppers, to avoid relaying for the users having strong direct
transmission we define a target secure connection probability δ
constraint for direct transmission, thus the upper bound dSD D
for dSD based on a target secure connection probability δ can
be written as
dSD D (δ) = max
{
dSD : exp
(−Ad2SD) > δ}
=
√
ln(1/δ)
A
(35)
Similar to the direct transmission, the upper bound dSD R
for dSD using relay transmission based on a target secure
connection probability δ can be written as
dSD R (δ) = max
{
dSD :
λRpi
2A+λRpi
exp
(
−Ad2SD2
)
> δ
}
=
√
2
A
ln
(
δ(2A+λRpi)
λRpi
)−1
(36)
If λRpi
δ(2A+λRpi)
< 1, we define dSD R (δ) = 0, which
means relay transmission strategy does not work for collud-
ing eavesdroppers. From (35), we can know that the target
secure connection probability can not be satisfied using direct
transmission, when dSD > dSD D. When dSD >
√
ln(1/δ)
A
,
we want to find how high λR can satisfy the target secure
connection probability for relay transmission.
Then, we define the secure gain G (δ) as the ratio of the
farther distance achieved between the source and the destina-
tion by using relay transmission and direct transmission, and
the secure gain for colluding eavesdroppers is shown as
G (δ) =
√√√√2 ln( λRpiδ(2A+λRpi)
)
ln (1/δ)
(37)
From (37), we can get when λR > 2A(δ+
√
δ)
pi(1−δ) , G (δ) > 1.
Because the source knows the relative distances between the
destination, the relays, and itself, it can decide whether a
relay is needed through (35), (36) and (37). The detailed
procedure is listed as follows: when dSD < dSD D , the direct
transmission is strong enough for the target secure connection
probability, then relay transmission is not necessary. Secondly,
when dSD > dSD D, the direct transmission can not satisfy
the target secure connection probability, then relay transmis-
sion can be used if λR >
2A(δ+
√
δ)
pi(1−δ) . Then, the relay selection
strategy is based on (15).
B. Non-colluding eavesdroppers
For non-colluding eavesdroppers, we find that (22) and (34)
are not easy to analyze because of the integrals. However,
we can also find that (7) and (17) is the lower bound
for direct transmission and relay transmission of colluding
eavesdroppers, respectively. Then, we can use the results of
(35) and (36) to analyze whether or not to relay transmission
for non-colluding eavesdroppers. Because (7) is the lower
bound for direct transmission of colluding eavesdroppers, thus
when dSD >
√
ln(1/δ)
A
, the given target secure connection
probability δ can be satisfied using direct transmission, while
if λR >
2A(δ+
√
δ)
pi(1−δ) , the given target secure connection prob-
ability δ must be satisfied using relay transmission, then we
can regard the results of (35) and (36) as a sufficient condition
for using relay transmission for non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Thus, the detailed procedures for determining whether a relay
is needed and which relay is selected are the same as the ones
in the colluding eavesdroppers case.
Fig. 5 shows the secure gain as a function of λR when
α = 4, and λE = 10−3, 10−5. From (36), we can find that
the secure gain become better with the increase of λR. When
λR → +∞, G (δ) →
√
2. When G (δ) < 1, it means that the
secure connection probability for direct transmission is better
than that of relay transmission. In this case, relay transmission
is not necessary even if the target secure connection prob-
ability can not be satisfied using direct transmission. When
G (δ) > 1, it means that the dSD R is farther than dSD D.
When dSD D > dSD, the direct transmission is still strong
enough for the target secure connection probability, then relay
transmission is not necessary. Only when dSD D < dSD , relay
transmission is necessary. From Fig.5, we can know how high
λR can match the case.
Fig. 6 shows the secure connection probability as a function
of λE when α = 4, λR = 10−3, 10−4, λE = 10−5, and
δ = 0.7. From (35), the upper bound dSD D for dSD is
85m. From (36), the upper bound dSD R for dSD is 115m
and 58m at λR = 10−3, 10−4, respectively. In Fig. 6, for
colluding eavesdroppers, we can find that when dSD > 85m,
direct transmission can not satisfy the target secure connection
probability. However, only if λR >
2A(δ+
√
δ)
pi(1−δ) = 1.6 × 10−4,
the secure connection probability for relay transmission can
satisfy the target secure connection probability. Then, it is
shown that when λR = 10−4 < 1.6×10−4, relay transmission
can not satisfy the target secure connection probability, while
when λR = 10−3 > 1.6× 10−4, the target secure connection
probability can be satisfied using relay transmission. For non-
colluding eavesdroppers, because (35) is the lower bound for
direct transmission, we can find that when dSD > 85m,
direct transmission can still satisfy the target secure connection
probability. However, when λR > 1.6 × 10−4, the secure
connection probability for relay transmission must satisfy the
target secure connection probability. Thus, the analysis results
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of (35) and (36) are regarded as a sufficient condition for using
relay transmission in non-colluding eavesdroppers case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the secure connection prob-
ability of direct transmission and relay transmission for collud-
ing eavesdroppers and non-colluding eavesdroppers strategies,
where the distributions of relays and eavesdroppers follow
homogenous PPPs. The lower bound expressions of secure
connection probability using RaF for colluding eavesdroppers
and non-colluding eavesdroppers strategies are obtained, and
it shows that the lower bound gives accurate approximation
of the exact performance in the small eavesdropper density
regime. Comparing the direct transmission with the relay
transmission, we find that whether or not to relay transmission
depends on the relay density and the distance between the
source and destination for a given target secure connection
probability. The results obtained from this study provide useful
design insights for relay networks with security constraints.
This paper focuses on the selection of one relay (i.e. best
relay). An interesting future work is to consider multi-relay
transmission and determine the condition under which relaying
gives more secure connection.
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